Abstract Medicine is increasingly taught in immersive simulated environments to supplement the apprenticeship model of work-based learning. Clinical research on this educational practice focuses on its realism, defined as a property of simulation technology. We treat realism as a function of subjective but collectively organized perception and imbued with fantasy, which we define by drawing on Lacanian studies of virtual reality and workplace organization. Data from an observational study of four simulation centres in London teaching hospitals is drawn on to present an account of what was taught and learned about medicine, including medical failure, when medical practice was simulated.
simulation and reality, foreclosing the possibility of seeing simulation as part of reality and also creating it, by signifying clinical events. Yet simulating an objectsuch as the gastro-intestinal system -or a situation -such as a woman in hospital because her mother is dying -involves understanding, explaining and feeling them, such that one can intervene on the basis of such sensibilities and narratives (Waldby, 1997; Johnson, 2008; Taylor, 2011; Johnson and Berner, 2012; McNaughton, 2012) . A simulation of a medical phenomenon thus stages how it comes to appear realistic. Thus, the recruitment of fantasy to explore simulationbased medical education highlights how this pedagogic practice is implicated in generating attachments to, and identifications with, ways of seeing, feeling and understanding medical work and phenomena.
Over the last ten years, many teaching hospitals internationally have had education facilities built that feature elements constituting operating theatres and hospital wards, such as beds, drug cabinets, and gas outlets. These facilities also include mannequins that produce physiological responses such as a palpable pulse rate, breathing sounds, and monitor readouts.
Although simulation has always featured in medical education -for example, actors used to simulate distressed patients in teaching how to break bad newsthese new 'high-fidelity' facilities respond to more recent concerns about the quality and range of work-based learning (CMO, 2008) . They are intended to act as a proxy for, or supplement to, the traditional medical apprenticeship, by making it possible to simulate not only isolated tasks, but also the complexity of the clinical setting, 'including its social and emotional dimensions' (Curran, 2010) .
The ethics of 'high-fidelity' simulation are usually articulated in the language of patient safety:
Mistakes made during simulated exercises do not cause harm to living patients and can be more easily exposed and discussed. Mishaps in the course of learning can thus be reviewed openly without concern of liability, blame, or guilt-even decisions and actions that result in the death of the simulated patient. SBME [simulation-based medical education] can help break the culture of silence and denial in medicine regarding untoward outcomes and mistakes and their implications about the learner's competence. (Ziv et al, 2003, p. 785) Simulation is treated as ethical, enabling inexperienced doctors to gain experience without harming patients, and doing so without the negative emotions associated with learning through trial and error.
Our experience of simulation-based teaching, however, leads us to question the ethics of treating patients as in need of protection from incompetent doctors, and doctors from the negative emotions consequent upon learning medicine. Such claims distribute risk, danger and safety to distinct places in a vision of what practising medicine involves, making some aspects invisible, abject, outside the frame of signification (Rancière, 2004a) . Treating simulation as affecting and affective in this way allows both practitioners and researchers to see how the practice is itself 'emotional' or invested with attachments and identifications, including the (partial) position from which a medical scene is modeled. Such a perception has political and methodological implications, troubling the treatment of reality as 'given'; indeed, the term 'fidelity' makes reality subject to consensus, with disagreement a consequence either of misunderstanding or incomprehension (Rancière, 2004b) . Differences in visions of reality are then cast as temporary delays until consensus is established; for instance, by better medical evidence, technology or practice. Pedagogically, simulation is then also treated as an anteroom prior to entry into a consensual community of experts, an 'innocent' order of reality (Pelletier, 2012) . Highlighting the fantasmatic aspects of simulation opens up possibilities for making the order of medical reality appear multiple, rather than ranging from inferior to superior, or low to high in fidelity. It also makes medical reality appear alterable and open to re-organization (Rancière, 1987; Pelletier, 2009) .
In this article, we are therefore looking to close the gap between the authentic original and the inauthentic forgery, and open one instead between the real and its sensibility, such that disagreements about whether a simulation is realistic or not can be heard not simply as a difference in levels of knowledge, but rather as involving a fantasmatic attachment to different versions of medicine.
What is Fantasy and How Do We 'Know'?
Our ideas about fantasy are informed by Lacanian approaches, in which fantasy is constitutive of knowledge rather than its opposite, and in which it is accounted for by looking at practices of signification, rather than, for instance, biological instinct. This makes fantasy a socio-cultural phenomenon, that which lends the real an imaginary appearance of meaning by signifying it in distinct ways.
In Lacanian accounts, fantasy gives desire a goal; it answers the question of what I desire, and what others desire of me (Žižek, 1989; Nusselder, 2009) : '[fantasy] provides a schema according to which certain positive objects in reality can function as objects of desire' (Žižek, 1997, p. 7) . In discussing how reality assumes its appearance, Lacan (2007) evokes the selectivity of both fantasy and perception: 'something sifts, sieves, in such a way that reality is only perceived by man, in his natural, spontaneous state at least, as radically selected. Man deals with selected bits of reality ' (p. 47) . Fantasy is thus not 'out there' in other people's minds, but intrinsic to collective sense-making, including research (Lapping, 2013) , which also gives desire a goal, such as 'more democratic healthcare', a practice whose characteristics we are endeavoring to articulate in this article.
Critical Business Studies
To explore how the fantasmatic dimension of simulation can be researched, we draw on two main bodies of research: critical business studies and simulation studies. In critical business and organization studies, a Lacanian conception of fantasy is deployed to describe how employees assume the desires and agendas articulated by the organization as their own, and, in so doing, become recognizable to themselves and to others as (good, useful, high-performing, flexible, etc.) employees (Hoedemakers, 2009; Cederström and Hoedemakers, 2010; Stavrakakis, 2008 Stavrakakis, , 2010 Glynos, 2008 Glynos, , 2010 Glynos, , 2011 . Fantasy here is aligned with ideology, a phenomenon employees invest in to secure a position for themselves within a meaningful scene: 'the logic of fantasy, then, can be construed as a narrative affirmed by workers, often unconsciously, preventing the contestation of suspect social norms, and making less visible possible counter-logics' (Glynos, 2010, p. 31) . This logic has a structure:
The logic of fantasy names a narrative structure involving some reference to an idealised scenario promising an imaginary fullness or wholeness (the beatific side of fantasy) and, by implication, a disaster scenario (the horrific side of fantasy). This narrative structure will have a range of features which will vary from context to context, of course, but one crucial element is the obstacle preventing the realisation of one's fantasmatic desire. (Glynos, 2010, p. 29) Such narratives are the subject of several research studies of fantasy in the workplace (Hoedemakers, 2007 (Hoedemakers, , 2009 Costas and Taheri, 2012) , which generate their accounts by describing the following: (1) the presentation of an ideal situation (e.g. safe healthcare); (2) the obstacle to the realization of that ideal (e.g. human error); and (3) a transgression of that ideal (e.g. unsafe healthcare). These three elements make sense of a situation, imposing a logic on it through a series of equivalences and differences. In our instance of simulation-based medical education, unsafe healthcare is bad healthcare; good healthcare is safe healthcare; the obstacle to good healthcare is human error.
In the critical business literature, fantasy is analysed to generate a critique of dominant norms that are 'suspect' insofar as they deny uncertainty and ambiguity and thereby lock subjects into repetitive cycles of failure and painful affects, notably guilt (Costas and Taheri, 2012) . To develop our example: the equivalence of good healthcare with safe healthcare makes invisible practitioners' work of judging among risks. Making denied aspects of work visible again is intended to enable employees to gain some distance from fantasy narratives and to 'read for difference' (Glynos, 2010) ; in other words, to generate appearances that account for work differently, often by showing the inter-dependence of opposites (e.g. the ideal of safe healthcare as dependent for its perpetuation on its real transgression, notably in the figure of the incompetent doctor). The notion of 'traversing the fantasy' (Žižek, 1997) accounts for what happens as a consequence of maintaining a critical distance, identifying a re-organization of the economy of affects and signifiers in the workplace, such that, for instance, good healthcare is no longer treated as logically equivalent to safe healthcare, with consequent effects on the distribution of guilt and enjoyment in medical work.
'Simulation Studies'
The second area of literature informing our analysis is less unified. Simulations are studied from different disciplinary perspectives, including film, internet and technology studies (Turkle, 1995; Žižek, 1997 Dean, 2010; McGowan, 2013; Nusselder, 2009 Nusselder, , 2013 . Whereas the critical business studies literature focuses on the subjugation of employees, film and internet studies place greater emphasis on consumers' enjoyment and pleasure: 'the fantasies accompanying computer technologies boil down to the notion that they offer us means to surpass the limits that reality imposes upon us. The standard fantasy about the new worlds opened up by computer technologies considers them as new spaces where all the old limits might be transcended' (Nusselder, 2009, p. 11) . Here, simulations appear as structured to offer relief from the burdens of reality: what we don't have in reality, we have as a simulation. Consequently, simulations also identify what a burden is, and what is lost or lacking in reality. To develop our example: 'high-fidelity' simulation is described as a way of surpassing the limitations imposed by the burden of reduced training hours (CMO, 2008) , a claim which makes the failures and risks presented by medical work appear as temporal phenomena: a lack of time, and thus a loss of experience. Simulationbased medical education then restores what is felt to have been lost. As in the critical business studies literature, fantasy is treated as a defense mechanism, which protects against the anxiety of uncertainty and ambiguity by staging a scene in which wishes are realized. The question, however, is whose wishes they are (Žižek, 1989) . The answer refers to the concept of the Other or the Other's gaze, the perspective from which a scene is staged such that the riddle of desire ('what do I want?'; 'what do others want from me?') is answered. The idea of the Other's gaze has been particularly influential in film studies, in exploring the perspective from which characters have to be seen to appear heroic, attractive, horrifying, feminine or masculine, as 'real' men or women, and so on. The Other's gaze is, in this respect, the camera's viewpoint, from which a scene is perceived to make sense, but within which it is not visible.
To take an example close to this paper's subject: in her studies of the Visible Human Project (VHP), Waldby (1997 Waldby ( , 2000 explores what makes this 'high fidelity' anatomical simulation so compelling in medical literature, arguing that its appeal lies in how it shows the body not simply as it is, but as it ought to be to a medical gaze: 'If the body's life can be described as animated matter, the technology of the VHP can effectively claim to have cancelled out the effects of death by translating the corpse into the simulational space of the virtual screen, with all its powers of complex animation. The VHP partakes of the general repression of death in medical knowledge of life, providing a complex model for the living body which is precisely a reanimated corpse' (Waldby, 1997) . The VHP is seen as a pedagogic breakthrough because it shows the body to be manipulable and controllable by medical intervention; as individual and standardized at the same time; and as eternal as software data, and thus no longer the bearer of mortality's burden (by contrast, for instance, with corpses which decay). The ability of the VHP to act as a surrogate for the fleshy body is dependent on 'users' identifying with this gaze, and the desires it animates.
In this vein of literature, the purpose of analysing fantasy is to make reality visible as an appearance, rather than an essence; an image or scene that is connected to the experience of pleasure and enjoyment. Simulations are treated not simply as reflections of such affective economies, but also as forms of instruction, teaching how and what to desire. For example, the VHP teaches the features of a desirable body in medicine, notably the qualities of being eternally reparable and not decaying uncontrollably. Analyses of fantasy enable discussion of the terms upon which a representation is seen and taught to be realistic. The notion of 'traversing the fantasy' arises here also, and points to the possibility of reconfiguring images to make denied aspects visible, the better to respond to them -'better' here implying a matter of politics and ethics.
Studying Fantasy in High-Fidelity Medical Simulation
These two domains of literature point to the way in which fantasy can be accounted for in terms of a narrative structure featuring an ideal, its obstacle, and its transgression, as well as a gaze that discriminates between these, in the form of burdens in reality and that which relieves them. The image of the subject is somewhat different in each domain, appearing either as the exploited worker of a capitalist labour market or as a consumer enjoying limitless capacities. We draw on both domains in part because they offer different kinds of empirical instantiations of the concept of fantasy, but also because the subject of simulation-based medical education appears to us as containing something of both the exploited worker and the entertained consumer.
Between January and October 2012, Caroline observed 30 training courses in the simulation centres of four London teaching hospitals, with a view to describing how teaching and learning happened in practice. The clinicians attending these courses were usually postgraduate 'trainee' doctors, sometimes also nurses and other health professionals. Each course involved 4-12 trainees, and 4-6 tutors, who were usually senior doctors and nurses. Courses usually lasted one day and were composed of three elements: first, an introductory lecture describing the purpose of the course; second, a sequence of scenarios (between 2 and 6), lasting approximately 15 minutes, in which 1-2 trainees 'played out' a situation specified by tutors in a simulated ward featuring one-way mirrors and video cameras, so that the other course participants could watch the action; third, and following each scenario, a 'de-briefing', lasting between 20 and 45 minutes, in which trainees and tutors discussed what happened. Caroline also interviewed eight trainees, six months after their participation in a course, about the pleasures and frustrations of their work, and whether the course had re-organized these. For this article, we are therefore drawing on field notes, interview transcripts, and the video recordings generated during the courses. Ethical approval for the research was granted by Imperial College, London, and funding was provided by the London Deanery.
Introductory Lectures: Simulation as Therapy for Medical Error
All but one of the courses presented high-fidelity simulation as an occasion in which to learn about a model of medical error called human factors, imported from other 'high-risk industries', notably aviation. This model was said to explain error in two ways. First, error is a function of faulty systems rather than individuals; second, error is inevitable because humans are fallible. Error could thus be learned from, rather than punished, and mitigated by gaining knowledge of 'non-technical skills'. The following excerpts illustrate how this model was presented:
Human error is responsible for 70 to 80% [of errors]. So it's not machines going wrong, the drugs are wrong, it's all human error. So 70 to 80%. It's something we need to keep in the back of our minds. We are humans, and we do make mistakes. But it's how we can recognize the risks in the situation that we are in. So we mentioned non-technical skills at the beginning, that we need to deal with a crisis, and the sorts of things that we are going to be looking at in each of the scenarios, although they are all different, is how you cooperate, how you lead, are you aware of the situation that you are in and managing that situation, and how you make decisions. So it's mainly non-technical skills. You'll all be very good at managing a patient who is sick, it's not what we are looking at, although it is part of it. We want to get you thinking about non-technical skills.
(Video transcript, Centre 1)
According to this logic, clinical work divides into two domains: the technical/ clinical and the non-technical/ interactional. Error is introduced into the clinical domain by means of its instantiation as interactional activity. The catholic resonance of this model of failure is brought out by the title of the medical report that was referenced in introductory lectures: To Err is Human (Institute of Medicine, 1999). Non-technical skills are those that turn inherent human fallibility into a virtue, overcoming the deadlock consequent upon figuring clinical knowledge as failing because of those who enact it. In terms of its narrative structure, the ideal is that of a healthy and health-giving system in which the distribution of skills to healthcare workers manages risk. The obstacle to this ideal is human fallibility itself: an intractable element identified on the basis of an ethos of resistance to something internal, irredeemable. It is this human factor which leads healthcare astray, causing it to kill rather than cure.
Within this account, simulation is safe because error can be detached from its consequences:
So I often say, when we're running full immersion simulation, particularly with the more junior doctors, is that 'make as many mistakes as you want because everyone can learn from it and you can't kill the mannequin'. Yeah? You can make it arrest but you can't kill it whereas if it's a real patient then you can.
(Video transcript, Centre 2)
The invitation to 'make mistakes' presents high-fidelity simulation as a transgression: because death is expunged, the prohibition on killing patients is removed. Trainees should make mistakes precisely to learn from them, an injunction which presents simulation as a place in which taboos are to be broken. This argument aligns with numerous accounts of 'virtual reality' as a site of perversion in which norms are transgressed (Turkle, 1995) , but with the effect of their fiercer enforcement in the 'real world', by virtue of the categorical difference inscribed between the virtual and the real (McGowan, 2013) .
The ethics of this model of error and simulation are brought into relief by comparing them to earlier accounts of failure in medicine, and by examining the viewpoint from which simulation is consequently perceived to be safe. In their classic studies of medical error, Bosk (2003) and Paget (2004) depict error as intrinsic to medicine. Bosk's study describes the classifications used by surgeons to identify different types of error, with some treated as constitutive of learning and doing surgery. Paget's treatise shows error to be endemic to medicine and inherent to the experimental effort involved in diagnosis and therapy. In each case, the obstacle to healthcare's efforts to heal is constitutive of its object of knowledge: 'medical work does not shape events, but risks a shape for events that are already going wrong' (Paget, 2004, p. 128) . Accounting for error in terms of human factors shifts the obstacle to the subject who practices medicine; error/ failure moves from the deed to the doer. Lack, in the Lacanian sense denoting the cause of failure, also shifts from medicine as an unpredictable, uncertain practice to the medical worker who lacks non-technical skills. Simulation then appears safe because such skills can be acquired with certainty -as evidenced by the safety record of the aviation industry, which uses simulation extensively.
Bosk's and Paget's accounts emerge from an identification with the profession of medicine: they endeavour to see error as it appears to clinicians in their work, and specifically in the latter's efforts to address risk in patients' bodies. A scene in which error is staged as tragic exception caused by human fallibility implies identification with another gaze, one which treats medical knowledge as perfectible, as error-free when applied correctly. By extension, such knowledge manufactures, and also, therefore, manages the risks implied by its practice. Paget argues that patients are prone to adopting such a gaze, to deny the burden of anxiety and uncertainty imposed by illness. Dejours (2008) , by contrast, presents this gaze as a managerial one, in which failure is a problem overcome through employee training. Both of these arguments suggest that human factors teaching can be construed as an invitation to identify with a gaze external to the professions of medicine: one which sees such professions as powerful and privileged by dint of the perfection of their scientific knowledge and burdened only by generic fallibility.
The introductory lecture, however, positioned tutors and trainees differently with respect to how failure could be perceived. Tutors emphasized the democratic consequences of a human factors model, which universalized the propensity to error and suspended the logic by which error equated with inexperience. Trainees, however, did not take up the invitation to 'make mistakes' enthusiastically: they demonstrated palpable anxiety at the start of courses and often throughout. This anxiety was explained in coffee breaks in terms of failing in the eyes of peers and seniors. The anxiety is suggestive of the different ways in which simulation appeared realistic and safe for tutors and trainees. Courses were set up for the benefit of trainees, which excluded the possibility of error being seen in the actions of tutors. Trainees, by contrast, were due to be watched by fellow professionals in order to make their failures perceptible. Error thus appeared on the basis of a lack of accredited knowledge and experience. The model of 'democratic' fallibility was thus realized in a course structure in which errors could only be seen in the actions of junior individuals -a pattern which repeats the organization of medical apprenticeship.
Scenarios: Plotting Narratives About Clinical Work
Scenarios were referred to in terms of the clinical condition they manifested, such as cardiac arrest, anaphylaxis, or ectopic pregnancy. Dramatized conditions were usually life-threatening. A scenario began with tutors telling trainees a brief narrative giving the patient/mannequin a back-story, such as: 'Mrs Smith has been admitted to A&E with stomach pain, and you are the first doctor to examine her'. The condition to be simulated was not revealed. The trainees acting in the scenario then entered the simulation room, and examined the mannequin, as well as other information set up by tutors, such as medical notes. A patient's condition invariably deteriorated rapidly, so that the trainee had to call in others to help. All of the scenarios concluded with a resolution of the emergency: the patient's life saved, the condition stabilized.
This narrative organization meant that presenting problems always had clinical solutions: the obstacle to be overcome was of a clinical nature, calling on the display of specialist clinical knowledge, and leading to clinical outcomes. Such outcomes, such as a stabilized blood pressure, appeared as the consequence of trainees' actions, such as giving fluids. Trainees thereby appeared as heroes in a story that told of the power of clinical intervention: an initial state of relative equilibrium is disrupted by an event (e.g. collapsing blood pressure), the trainee takes action and, by this action, brings the chaos to an end (Todorov, 1977) . The hero was played by whichever profession was being trained: courses for anaesthetists idealized anaesthetic intervention; courses for surgeons idealized surgical intervention; courses aimed at junior medical trainees demonstrated the power of their professional capacity to save patients, and featured seniors and nurses as secondary characters within the drama. One course only departed from this script: aimed at nurses, participants were called on to respond to multiple, relatively stable patients (rather than a single critically ill one) and ongoing obstacles that were not resolved. By virtue of this narrative structure, the role of the Herculean hero was replaced by that of the Sisyphean worker, a difference that perhaps throws some light on the different organization of desire in medicine and nursing.
Although scenarios were differentiated by the clinical classification of the obstacle, the element common to all of them was the threat of death. Always present in the wings, death, however, never entered the stage, a narrative convention that tutors described as 'the mannequin never dies'. The removal of death's burden echoes Waldby's (1997) claim that, in marking medicine's point of failure, death is repressed in medical simulation. However, whereas in Waldby's anatomical simulators death was not represented, it appeared in our study as foreclosed transgression: always there, and always pre-empted. The nightmare of killing patients was repeatedly envisaged and dissipated.
Ahmed's (2009) articulation of happiness and its role in 'suturing' a collective is perhaps helpful here, in that she refers to happiness as an ideal which establishes consensus on what a 'we' should strive for, illustrating this through the image of the happy family. The image of the happy family enforces heterosexual norms by making non-heterosexual bonds appear necessarily unhappy. In representing patient survival as the collective object of clinical desire, and such survival as a function of 'teamwork', the solidarity of work appeared structurally and narratively in opposition to the death of patients: patients survived because clinical teams happily bonded.
In presenting patient survival, professional belonging and clinical capacity as equivalent, the narrative conventions of the scenarios reflected trainees' accounts, generated during interviews, of what made clinical work enjoyable:
You may sort of feel embarrassed to say it, but I do quite like the adrenalin when you've got somebody, and it's three in the morning, and they're about to die and you're trying to stop them about to die, I quite like that.
(Angela, medical trainee)
However, the desirability and excitement of near patient death contrasts with how trainees portrayed their usual work routines:
I remember the initial disappointment of becoming a doctor, and it's your first year as a doctor, and you think you're going to be seeing patients and actually a lot of what you do is being delegated these menial administrative tasks.
(Tracy, medical trainee)
The imagery of clinical power overcoming obstacles also contrasts with how trainees represented the frustrations of their work:
All specialities come with some conditions which slightly fill you with a sense of futility, that you're not really doing anything. So […] people with alcoholic liver disease. You work really hard and you do all the exciting stuff to get them better but they'll keep drinking and they'll come back again.
(Peter, medical trainee)
These accounts of the pleasures and frustrations of clinical work are suggestive of the enjoyment offered by simulation scenarios: they dramatized narratives of the clinical (and trainee's) capacity to shape events, making imperceptible menial administration and futile expert action. These consequently appeared as external to 'real' clinical work.
We discussed above the argument in the simulation studies literature that the pleasure simulations afford and the realism they are attributed stems from the way they remove burdens that limit the scope for self-realizing action in 'reality' (Nusselder, 2009; Žižek, 2013) . The narrative structure of scenarios, including the choice of obstacle confronting the hero (which, for instance, does not require him/her to address intractable welfare needs or operate marginally in bureaucratic organizations) shows both how they appeared realistic (showing real clinical action, in a parallel way to how films generate pleasure by showing 'real' men or 'real' romance) as well as how they functioned pedagogically, teaching not merely skills, but their meaning within a vision of what clinical work should, ideally, consist of.
De-Briefing: Making Error and Failure Explicable
Scenarios were followed by group discussions arranged in a large circle. Tutors started by asking the group to describe what happened, often requesting that those who had participated in a scenario withhold their input initially. This was intended to collectivize the experience, and also acknowledged that such participants were often lost for words. In describing 'what happened', trainees and tutors constructed a narrative organized by causes and reasons, decisions and strategies, and historicized through the use of the past tense, which made events perceptible through a lens of hindsight, in relation to what they eventually led to.
Accounting for what happened, however, positioned trainees and tutors differently.
Trainees who had participated in a scenario often referred to what they should have done, what they had not seen or known, what they had not done well: the scenario, in its retrospective signification, was narrativized in the tragic genre of a tale of regret and missed opportunities. By contrast, tutors' interventions -notably, via the frequently asked question: 'so, what could you have done differently?' -portrayed the scenario as one possible performance among multiple others, imbued with what Murray (1997) describes as the 'malleability' of the comedy genre, in which mistakes are retrievable and stories can be started over and reach a different resolution -foreclosing, for instance, the finality of death.
The difference in genre points to a difference in gaze. In manifesting guilt in the wake of failure, trainees identified with a gaze that knows and passes judgement on correct and incorrect action, innocent and culpable people. This is suggestive of a desire to know, with certainty and without ambiguity, one's capacities as a clinician; knowing for sure whether one's actions are correct or erroneous. In describing non-technical skills as indeterminate, tutors identified with (and explicitly named) a 'non-judgemental' gaze from whose comic perspective failure was an occasion for bonding. One might argue, then, that trainees' confessions did not address an actual gaze -that of tutors -but an imagined one, with much greater authority. This account was offered to us by several tutors who characterized trainee interventions in de-briefings as repeated requests for reassurance.
Such an account neglects two phenomena. The first is the explanation for failure given by tutors to trainees, which established a de facto guilt by virtue of the human factor. The second is the repeated offer of reassurance given by tutors to trainees on the quality of their performance. Although simulation courses were described as occasions for 'non-judgemental' teaching interventions, the usual pattern of exchanges consisted of the tutor's initiation of the discussion, the trainee's response and the tutor's positive judgement. As an example:
Tutor 1 Trainee And then quite early on I had to have a quite grumpy conversation with someone on the phone. I was probably a bit rude, and I do apologize for that […] Tutor 2 And you were very succinct in stating he's sick, we haven't done anything, we are resuscitating, and he's not going to go anywhere, so I think that was really good Tutor 1 I think you were really clear, I think you were assertive
[…] Tutor 2 I thought you did that very well, because you were assertive Tutor 1 You were very assertive, I thought it was very good Tutor 2 And the whole point of your focus was your patient, that was very apparent. And that you really didn't have time to talk. And you can have all of this administrative conversation in the background later on. That was done very effectively (Video transcript, Centre 2)
The extract illustrates a discursive pattern of re-signifying confessed failures, in which, 'chopping and changing' is re-signified as 'changing tack', while 'rude' is re-signified as 'assertive'. The pattern illustrates how human factors were taught: namely, by initiating an account of a guilty self, and then re-signifying it to make it show non-technical capability. The substantive content of 'non-technical skills' was thus the negation of guilt. Tutors' comedic interventions might also be understood in terms of such a negation. Negation, however, implies recognition of a positive form (Kress and Hodge, 1979) : trainees' anxiety was consequent, we would argue, upon this recognition.
Fantasizing Collective Action to Rescue Patients
To explore the ethical implications of this negation, we would like to compare the discursive pattern above to an exception within our fieldwork. It occurred during a course organized to remedy the high number of 'failure to rescue' incident reports generated by one ward ('failure to rescue' is a category within the health service's taxonomy of errors, and refers to an event in which healthcare workers failed to respond appropriately to a rapidly deteriorating patient, who then died). All ward staff had been invited to attend, although, on the day of our visit, the participants consisted exclusively of nurses. During the introductory lecture, a tutor (a doctor) said that the course was not about punishing poor performance, but learning to respond better to an emergency. Several participants responded sceptically:
So what are you going to do if you come round to my ward and I have seven patients to look after, two post-ops, and no healthcare assistant? What are you going to say or do?
(Field notes, Centre 4)
The tutor responded that 'hospital management', in the form of the deputy director of nursing, had also been invited, so that she could learn about the problems staff were experiencing and support them in overcoming these. Several participants responded that 'their' problems were caused by management's costcutting exercises. The first of several scenarios then took place. These were, however, perceived differently from on other courses: they simulated something different. The following extract from a group discussion illustrates this:
Tutor 1 The problem is, Sally, you didn't tell your team-mates you had the sickest patient. I was just interested in knowing -it's not a criticism -why you felt you had to cope on your own? Nurse 1 That's what I do on the ward Tutor 1 You might be stuck in a ward when you are trying to cope and you don't go and get help? Nurse 1 I'm just re-living yesterday, it's constantly juggling. I find it heavy-going, but I don't want to seem I'm not coping with it Nurse 2 We need to re-design the system so that nurse leaders don't get attached to particular beds and oversee the whole ward [there follows an extended discussion about whether this system is in fact already in place but undermined by staff shortages] Sally's failure/error here appears as common practice on the ward. Nurse 2's intervention, for instance, treats Sally's failure to call for help as indicative of the division of labour on the ward, a move corroborated by Tutor 1's final contribution. What the scenario shows, therefore, is how work is done, including the feelings associated with this ('juggling, heavy going'). What it does not appear to show, as on other courses, is Sally's (inadequate) clinical capability or inherent human fallibility.
In this and other group discussions on the day, scenarios were treated by participants as ways of showing management, as well as each other (note above the statement 'I don't want to seem I'm not coping with it'), the realities of work, in contrast to its prescribed representation; for instance, subsequent to the extract quoted above, there was extended discussion about the impossibility of completing the 27-point admissions checklist within the allocated time. This made Sally's failure illustrative of an antagonism between resources and prescribed work tasks, and signified the checklist as the expression, but not the realization, of the ideal of making patients safe. The obstacle to such an ideal shifted from human fallibility to the multiple and conflicting desires within healthcare. The transgression of that ideal appeared as unrealized protocols consequent upon conflicting priorities, rather than employee ignorance or incapability.
This transformation in what could be seen in a scenario -the basis on which it appeared realistic -illustrates aspects of the Lacanian notion of 'traversing the fantasy'. The introductory lectures and subsequent group discussions staged a conflict between two narratives for failed rescue: 'management only care about cutting costs' versus 'nurses lack non-technical skills'. The re-enactment of clinical work made visible the gap between each explanation for failure and inarticulated work/management practices: it made visible what each explanation endeavored to hide, such as that the hospital's budget had been cut and that staff numbers had been reduced. Real antagonisms within healthcare provision became speakable, making it necessary for nurses and tutors to loosen attachments to fantasized narratives about failure.
The notion of traversing the fantasy implies constructing alternative/better fantasies, rather than abandoning fantasy altogether (Žižek, 2013) . So what were the two fantasized narratives for failure replaced with? Amid discussions about whose performance was to blame, tutors' interventions evoked the possibility of finding better ways of managing antagonisms between work tasks. In the extract above, for instance, the tutors do not offer absolution, but rather ask the group to find, collectively, responses to the realities that the scenario showed. This request was resisted several times with counter-claims that management had this responsibility, but statements were also made describing intentions to review the division of labour with respect to specific tasks; the ability and right to do this was thereby also claimed (Rancière, 2004a, b) . The fraughtness of such discussions demonstrates the work (in the psychoanalytic as well as the everyday sense) involved in constructing the fantasy of collective, cooperative team working (Dejours, 2009) . Although agreement was not reached on the day of our visit, there was promise in fantasizing the division of labour as a collective achievement, not only because it offered a practical example of 'more democratic healthcare', but also because it grappled with the problem of failed rescue more substantively than fantasies of human fallibility and negated guilt.
Conclusion: Re-Thinking the Relationship Between Simulation, Fidelity and Learning
In this paper, we have endeavoured to show that high-fidelity simulation does not simply denote clinical practice, but mythologizes it (Barthes, 1957 (Barthes, , 1961 : it is not so much analogous to reality, mechanically reproducing it, but rather constitutes a commentary on clinical practice, teaching values, reasons and desires about how such practice ought to be seen and felt. It is insofar as participants identify with such a perception that simulation appears faithful to reality. This argument has implications for considering the ethics of simulation, raising questions about how it is implicated in teaching professional ideals and identifying the obstacles to their realization, as well as the burdens of clinical work.
Treating simulation as a mythology might be read as a criticism of its educational value: a dismissal of its claim to realism and an identification of its deceptive illusions. Such a reading treats simulation as a lie, in the Platonic sense of a simulacrum, and/or as an occasion for ideological revelation, showing how far the forgery has strayed from its authentic original. Both moves assume that reality can be seen and known directly, unmediated by fantasy. We have drawn on the Lacanian notion of fantasy to avoid this reading of our argument, and to treat fantasy as that which enables reality to make sense -something one can be faithful to -rather than which leads away from it.
The concept of fantasy does, however, denaturalize reality, pointing to how it emerges affectively, by excluding, abjecting, and papering over contradictions. In the first part of the analysis, we focused on how an account of human factors assigned risk to human fallibility and systems design, thereby excluding error from clinical work and patients' bodies. Compared to earlier sociological accounts of medical failure, the 'human factors' narrative shifted error's location from the practice of clinical work to the practice of clinical workers. This was justified in terms of patient safety, making error into a redeeming occasion for learning rather than the endlessly and unproductively repeating nightmare of killing patients.
We have argued that this way of making error into a phenomenon one can learn from made practitioners guilty by default. By implication, also, it made them not responsible. It is in the light of this account of a perfectible science degraded by the fallibility of its human yet heroic practitioners that we interpret trainees' anxiety during simulation courses, as well as the guilt articulated in debriefings, which was invariably accompanied by a denial of responsibility; indeed, whenever errors were evoked (almost exclusively by trainees on their own performance), there followed shortly after a discussion of their causes in the limitations of the technology. This raises a question about what was learned from error on simulation courses.
What was stated to be learned was how to avoid or mitigate errors in 'real' clinical practice. This treats error as a matter of consensus: it is there for all to see and learn from. Our account of the 'failure to rescue' course shows rather the identification of error, and the account of clinical reality, to be contested social practices -a claim often made in literature on error in 'real' clinical practice (Waring, 2009) . The work and frustration we witnessed in explaining 'failure to rescue' points to what was avoided on most courses, in which emphasis was placed by tutors on identifying and praising 'non-technical skills' and emphasizing realism, rather than discussing failure. The ethics of simulation have been justified in terms of pre-empting the social antagonism associated with medical error and its consequences, and which makes error difficult to learn from (Ziv et al, 2003) ; we would, however, argue that such antagonism was pre-empted not so much by the cancellation of error's effects as by the marginalization of considerations such as whose view of reality and error was represented in a simulation, whose was excluded, and according to which principles and pleasures clinical practice had been selectively 'sieved' for its simulation.
We started this paper by describing our aim in terms of closing the gap between the original and its forgery and encouraging more democratic healthcare. These aims are closely related, in treating reality as contingent appearance rather than given essence: a phenomenon subject to disagreement rather than expert consensus. Defending these aims does not involve giving up on reality and sinking into relativism and 'mere' fantasy, but rather putting questions about what constitutes reality at the centre of simulation's pedagogic practice, such that disagreements about what makes clinical practice good, better or fail, meaningful or meaningless, are visible and articulable. Our account of the 'failure to rescue' course is suggestive of how this might be achieved, as well as the work involved in bringing fantasies to light through the identification of difference within reality, within the multiple and conflicting narratives about what is desirable in healthcare. It shows what scope there is for simulation to change from serving as an ante room prior to entry into a given reality, to an occasion on which to dramatize and 'work through' the fantasies which make clinical practice meaningful, as well as the obstacles which threaten this. In this respect, we would argue for an ethics of simulation based on its instantiation of a distinct regime of visibility, in which the meaning and organization of work is subject to collective deliberation, rather than on its promise of protecting patients from doctors. This regime can be imagined as allowing fantasies to be adjusted and re-framed, to address repeated and painful failure, including the death of patients.
